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Anomie, System Reform, and
Challenges to the UN System
Raymond F. Hopkins

/ Rising ethnic conflicts pose a serious challenge to the world's international organizations in the late 1990s. Public agencies created to articulate and implement multilateral policy, especially the principal one, the
United Nations, have inadequate capacity to ameliorate such conflicts.
The civil strife and killing in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and the
Israel-Lebanon-Occupied Territories complex and the continuing conflicts in Cambodia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Rwanda/Burundi, Sri Lanka,
and many other countries are not, or at least have not been, resolvable
by the intervention of one or a few outside allied states. With support
from many states the UN secretary-general himself called for a "wider
mission," the imposition of global authority to resolve such conflicts
(Boutros-Ghali 1992b, 8). Though the possibilities for intervention have
increased since the end of the cold war, however, the UN cannot meet
new responsibilities in this area without substantial reform.
Two institutional reforms are required. Ffrst, conflicts among basic
principles and norms guiding international action need resolution,
particularly the conflict between state sovereignty principles and human rights principles. These must be reconciled in ways that give
legitimacy to expanded action by IOs in cases of state failure. Second,
the capabilities of IOs, principally the United Nations, need expansionf
In the early 1990s as the UN undertook broader responsibilities iri
southern Europe, Southeast Asia, and Africa, it was critically short
of coercive capability, basic humanitarian supplies, intelligence and
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communications, and managerial competence. Without greater exter) '
nal resources and internal management changes, the current challenges cannot be met. Worse still, the UN and perhaps IOs more
generally will suffer a decline in respect and authority.
In the post-cold-war era international organizations, particularly the
United Nations, are experiencing irreversible incremental changes. The
challenge of intervening to ameliorate violence and innocent suffering
engendered by ethnic conflicts is but one of several increased demands
on IOs, and the important role of UN agencies in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Cambodia represents not merely an episodic or
"transitional" phase but a real, however modest, step-level change in
the functions of IOs.
This chapter does not assess the intriguing question of how the end
of the cold war has affected the strength or weakness of the state
system. In fact, it does not even challenge the centrality of states in
contemporary international politics, although it is clear from the collapse of states such as Somalia and Yugoslavia that the system faces
difficulties. For example, consider the dilemma of how states can intervene to preserve a state without violating the historical norm of noninterference. One result of such post-cold-war dilemmas is a change of
attitude about international politics, a growing confusion and disagreement about traditional norms, i.e., a case of "anomie" in international
affairs. This anomie, as discussed later in this chapter, creates conditions conducive to incremental change in the structure of IOs.
In this chapter I focus almost exclusively on the UN system. The
effects of ethnic conflicts on other international organizations is less
clear, I believe, in part because regional IOs are even weaker than
universal ones and their features vary widely. Consider, for example,
the variety among non-UN IOs, including regional bodies such as the
Organization of American States, the Arab League, the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, and nonregional bodies such as the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
This chapter argues two theses: first, that the normative order has )
declined and, second, that one result has been the overburdening of
the United Nations. Elaborating briefly, I contend that the cold war
provided international norms based on structured antagonisms. In the
absence of these antagonisms, the norms have weakened, and anomie
has increased. It has become more difficult for states and IOs to recognize their interests and pursue them through prudent action. In this
·situation ethnic conflicts and other dangers, including weakened control over nuclear weapons, pose increased threats to peace and stability
in the international system. With declining domestic support and unclear interests, however, states are less able to take unilateral or com-
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mon state-level action against these threats. The result is that more
states expect IO intervention to solve problems related to international
public goods. For example, the dominant impulse is to work through
the IOs, especially the UN system, to resolve ethnic conflicts in Bosnia,
Rwanda, and Somalia. The expectation of the IO role is far greater in
the 1990s than any time since the months following World War II.
Resources and revised normative underpinnings to equip IOs for an
expanded role have failed to emerge, however. Thus we have a dangerous situation. Until an adequate intellectual and financial base is established, the UN's response to these shifting demands and expectations
is likely to be judged a failure.

Anomie and a New International Order
Anarchy, the key element in international politics, reflecting the absence of a hierarchical order and the relative independence of like
nation-state units (Waltz 1979; Oye 1986), continues largely unaffected
by the end of the cold war. What changed was ideology. Polarized
belief systems collapsed, and when they did, the attitudes of millions
of people about paths towards modernization, the virtues of technology, and the legitimacy of democratic practices for exercising authority changed.
Emile Durkheim described "anomie" as a kind of moral turbulence.
In illustration, it is the loss of her/his moral anchor which a peasant
feels upon entering urban life. The morality of village society, with its
fixed categories for gender and age relationships, for linkage to work,
and for conferring worth, enables a person to succeed by doing what
is expected. In the post-World War II global society, bipolar solidarity
provided such guiding norms. At the international level it reinforced
norms of state sovereignty, limited UN actions, and gave a reasonably
clear rationale for multinational policy coordination. Indeed, the states
of the West and the Soviet bloc, by performing expected tasks, "saw"
rewards for their actions (George 1983). In current global society, as for
the peasant entering the city, however, things have "fallen apart," and
the old normative order has lost relevancy, engendering a search for
new ways of doing things and a new set of moral and practical rules.
One key issue is how existing identities and moral systems relate to the
global spread of liberalism. The individual freedom to act celebrated by
the liberal political and economic order contains an invitation for ethnic
groups to assert claims.
The future of IOs and the resolution of ethnic conflicts will be
shaped by consequential changes occurring in the 1990s in the subjec-
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tive realm. Identities, expectations, demands are in flux-far more so
than the distribution of power among major states. There have been
attitude shifts regarding animosities and threats across borders, most
clearly in Europe and the Middle East following German reunification
in 1991 and the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian accord and in Africa following
state failures in Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, and Rwanda. The identities
and goals of peoples within many states have also shifted: witness
changes inside the states of the former Soviet Union, of Eastern Europe, and of South Africa. Theorists, recognizing this shift in subjectivities around the world, interpret it differently. One vision sees
communal-oriented conservatives, in the guise of Islamic fundamentalists, neo-Nazis, neo-Stalinists, or the religious right (as in the United
States), pursuing various forms of international xenophobia. Such
groups mobilize fears of disadvantaged peoples as a way to counter
threats they see in an approaching consensus on "liberal" norms,
which are diffusing through non-Western cultures. Because these
norms challenge traditional values, they are rejected by anachronistic
minorities. Norms of exchange and trade based on reciprocity and
rationality, for example, while consistent with both capitalist and Marxist economic ideas, are anathema to some communal or nonsecular
traditions. International agreements, whether they be free-trade or
Israeli-Palestinian accords, are seen as dangerous, for they push pragmatic action and greater foreign involvement in local problems. Foreigners proposing global solutions under an IO banner, therefore, are
distrusted, even hated. Realist theorists are particularly sensitive to
this post-cold-war phenomenon. For them, narrow solidarity groups,
demanding to be organized within effective new state structures, are
the basic new property in world politics (Moynihan 1993), and they
greet the rise of communal, particularistic sentiments with special
pess1m1sm.
At the other extreme are theorists, usually liberal optimists, who
see the current era principally as an opportunity to revitalize world
federalism. This group finds in the collapse of the cold war the
prospect for greater international harmony, a new order grounded in
coherent, inclusive, and increasingly effective international regimes.
According to this interpretation, as these regimes expand, particular
issue areas will be governed more effectively because of greater international policy coordination, especially through existing (or occasionally new) international organizations (Young 1989b; Wendt 1992). This
governance will often occur within the United Nations but not exclusively so. WTO, the European community, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, the World Bank, and International
Monetary Fund, and other organizations are expected to play an im-
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portant role in international affairs (Ruggie 1992). The renewal of the
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995, for example, is predicted to be
a major advance, consolidating already strengthened NPT norms and
enforcement mechanisms. Such "regimes", as the one represented by
the NPT, will perform an "agency" function, acting as entities to express behaviorally an underlying structured complementarity of norms
and principles-orientations that are emerging as part of the new postcold-war order.
The liberal view is premature. The evidence is mixed that stronger
norms of world order now exist or that democratic values, including
human rights, are in the ascent. In fact, regimes such as those regulating trade and nonnuclear violence seem to have been stronger in the
cold-war era than they are in the 1990s. International diplomatic
norms, flouted only on occasion in earlier years by Libya and Iran,
appear (in the 1993-1994 era) to be readily and flagrantly violated by
Serbian nationalists, Iraqi expansionists, or North Korean iconoclasts.
Both views face a problem. They ignore the growth of normative
confusion. Instead, each falsely assumes the existence of a key ingredient for their diagnosis, that is, that consensus on principles, norms,
and expectations has become more widespread among the world's
populace. The struggle over the meaning of sovereignty and the significance of ethnic conflict exemplifies this problem. While violation of
human rights within a state is now less tolerated, norms for action are
in disarray. Confusion over what norms govern behavior undercuts the
view of pessimistic realists who see new cleavages between cultures
(Huntington 1992) and also that of idealist reformers who see the approach of an orderly new world system.
Thus with the decline of the ideological antagonism between the
United States and the USSR .and the rise of "liberal" views (Doyle
1986), roles for states have become less clear. Improvisation is common
in international behavior or in mediating ethnic rivalries. This decline
in clear norms for state policy has led to an increase in the demand for
international institutions to undertake or legitimate conflict resolution
among groups. Strategy calculations have become less certain; nationstates' "interests" are less easy to discover in the absence of bipolar
cold-war rivalry. Thus, the UN is more readily perceived as the agent
for defining the interests of its members. It can respond, many believe,
to the felt obligations of individuals and nation-states to protect individual human rights and group ethnic rights. In doing so it can reject
constructions of pluralist states that violate them (e.g., as in apartheid
South Africa or the occupied lands of Israel). Thus states and groups
reasonably turn to the United Nations as a vehicle for addressing such
issues and as a way to clarify, through multilateral processes, their
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own interest in intervention, the promotion of peace, and the maintenance of sovereignty.

Sovereignty Reconstruction and the UN
Can the United Nations serve such ends in the 1990s and beyond?
The anomie condition of international society does provide an opportunity for institutional development of the United Nations. It can be
the arena for reworking conflicting historic norms, of sovereignty and
justified intervention to empower the UN to develop operational procedures for managing ethnic conflict. The capacity of the United Nations
itself to deal with weakening norms, however, is problematic. Evolving
identifications among peoples within state borders have bred greater
intrastate disaffection and mutual antagonism. Perceived injustices
and the competing demands to which they give rise have created an
epidemic of ethnic conflicts. More established nation-states are understandably ambivalent about taking action in these cases, especially outside the framework of an international organization.
Sovereignty has been anchored in established identities of people
and has shaped the provision of human rights by defining the role of
the state. Now that these and other important social constructions in
international politics are in flux, peoples' degree of security and their
sense of community (see Lasswell 1935; and Deutsch 1966) have been
stirred up. Previously, these were subordinated to such global constructs as revolution, but the removal of cold-war requirements has
liberated them. Ethnic conflict is basically a product of differential ego
identifications. Rooted historical antagonisms emerge as the basis of
hostility among differentiated groups whose belief systems are mutually exclusive. Such conflict is particularly intractable because there is
an absence of inclusionary norms allowing for mutual accommodation.
When new conflicts arise for which historical norms prove inadequate to help develop accommodation, anomie is the consequence.
Consider the "nation-state" dilemma. At least a minimal degree of
shared global identity is necessary for each state to exist successfully.
One cannot imagine a world of successful states in which the exclusivity of each state leads to total anarchy and their roles derive solely
from domination by force (Kaplan 1957). Thus, conventions, norms,
and international principles all provide a social context within which
different peoples, acting through various collectivities, particularly
states, shape international affairs through various historical cycles (Puchala 1994). Grand schemes of thought, for example, Western liberalism, diffuse around the world to provide the intellectual milieu within
which peoples and their agents construct new organizational patterns
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and undertake productive or destructive actions (see Bull 1977; Keohane 1984; Haas 1990; Ruggie 1992). In this milieu, changes in the
firmness and clarity of norms affect the relative strength and innovativeness of international institutions. That is, it is not strategic
calculation among power holders that inhibits otherwise effective UN
interventions to minimize ethnic combat or prevent its spread to
others. Rather, it is the absence of structured complementarity among
belief systems and attitudes about what procedures and methods are
appropriate.
Changes in identities and "interests" attached to shared identities
are bringing pressure to reconstruct principles of sovereignty. The formulation of this social construct, embracing peaceable order, property
rights, self-determination (identity rights), and universal principles, is
under challenge. In its "normal" application, the sovereignty principle
has sanctioned a secular state system, autonomous from religious
claims (Ruggie 1993, 163). This secular system, however, was maintained particularly by cold-war bipolarity. Recently, newer "interests,"
discovered by peoples released from this crumbled structure, suggest
that sovereignty rules need reworking. As Alexander Wendt notes,
"Sovereignty norms are now so taken for granted, so natural, that it is
easy to overlook the extent to which they are both presupposed by
an ongoing artifact of practice" (Wendt 1992). For example, territorial
divisions, many artificial-as between North and South Korea, Somalia and Ethiopia, or Lebanon and Israel-have been seen as nonnegotiable aspects of sovereignty for much of the postwar era. Now,
however, the UN is involved in territorial discussions to create new
boundaries (in the case of Bosnia) or negotiate new formulas for rule
within older ones (in the case of Somalia).
Norms of sovereign independence are evolving, under the impetus
of pressure to contain the violence of ethnic conflicts and the loosening
of cold-war ideas. External actors, seeking to alleviate the negative
consequences of ethnic conflicts, have sought to modify norms to better justify intervention (Reed and Kaysen 1993). Responsibilities of UN
organs have also expanded. Territorial adjustments, once within the
purview of the UN only in decolonization cases, are now subject to
UN review. The UN also has a larger role in protection of basic needspromoted for example by UNICEF's "Adjustment with a Human Face"
campaign and reflected in the Department of Humanitarian Affairs.
Finally, the UN's World Court (at the Hague) has taken on the authority
(analogous to the Nuremburg trial authority) to identify and prosecute
individuals for crimes against humanity. These new responsibilities
are indicative of changing demands on the UN and more generous
expectations about its ability to play a constructive role in human af-
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fairs. They also show growing anomie in international affairs as realist
assumptions about states as units and the legal principles of sovereignty are challenged (Reisman 1990).

External Intervention to Support Sovereignty
As norms are challenged, it is proposed that domestic autonomy,
supported by the sovereignty principle, does not always override
global humanitarian standards. Marc Trachtenberg, for example, concludes that "the great powers, having ended the dispute that effectively
neutralized their collective force, can now set the norms that not
only govern the nature of international conflict but also set limits to
what sovereign states can do within their own borders" (Trachtenberg
1992, 228).
The establishment of human rights has grown since World War II,
sanctified in countless declarations and resolutions by the United Nations and other international bodies. After the Persian Gulf war against
Iraq, UN resolution 688 authorized humanitarian intervention to protect Kurds in northern Iraq. In light of this precedent, former secretarygeneral Manuel Perez de Cuellar asked whether the sovereigntypreserving intent of article 2 of the UN Charter, which prohibits intervention in domestic affairs, was to be superseded by humanitarian
concerns. He asked in particular whether "the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, do[ es] not implicitly call into question the inviolable
notion of sovereignty" (cited in Lewis 1991, 16).
Sovereignty provides fundamental advantages to people. It creates
a presumption about noninterference from people outside the state
unit, thus enhancing the safety of people's lives and property from
"foreign" interference. It also presumes a single authoritative body or
procedural code for establishing rules over the people and territory. It
is expected to protect against crime, enforce contracts, and secure the
rights of individuals and groups (families, religious associations, ethnic
groups). Sovereignty assures people that the relationships into which
they enter will endure for a long time and that expectations of outcomes will be less problematic. Markets should flourish under sovereignty, and incentives should be improved for sharing the burden of
the cost of collective goods and for the more effective provisioning of
these goods. Political and legal philosophers have long noted these
properties. When the government of a sovereign state effectively delivers such advantages to people, the "inviolability" of the government,
people, and territory defining the sovereign state commands the recognition and acceptance of other actors in international affairs.
When, however, a state fails in these "duties," the socially con-
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structed mandate of sovereignty becomes increasingly problematic.
Ethnic conflicts give rise to such questions. Property rights and individual rights of a legal and social nature, when extended to some but
not all ethnic groups within a state, is a systematic source of tension
among people. In such cases the writ of the state to control property,
to allocate resources, to impose obligations on people is challenged by
"entrepreneurs" representing the interests of disadvantaged groups.
As these claims are contested, they become associated with protest
and eventually, if unresolved, with violence. This in turn undermines
the very rationale for the existence of the mandated sovereignty. Thus,
states that systematically discriminate against groups within their borders, as South Africa did for decades against its nonwhite populations,
give rise to widespread external condemnation and the withdrawal of
some privileges of sovereignty. Economic sanctions against South Africa were imposed in the 1980s, for example, precisely for its failure to
fulfill sovereignty mandates regarding the protection of individual and
group rights, property, and lives for all its population. Legal explorations and explications of human rights doctrines since World War II
have heightened sensitivity to and collective consciousness of the
rights it is believed sovereign states are obliged to protect and uplift.
By nurturing and promoting recognition of such rights, international
organizations, particularly the United Nations, have helped construct
a status for individuals and, with less clarity, for groups (see the problem of less-developed rights for groups as discussed by Milton Esman,
Chapter 1) which, in ideal circumstances, can be "nested" within principles of sovereignty.
The "sovereignty regime," therefore, accommodates and embraces
an unfolding and expanding set of purposes and obligations for maintaining the sovereignty of a particular government, territory, and
people (Krasner 1988; Wendt 1992). These obligations are a nested
subregime within the concepts and empirical activity of a sovereign
state. Their shaping, however, derives from lateral pressure exercised
by other sovereign states and through multilateral bodies that formulate and refine the meaning and obligations of sovereignty (see Ruggie
1992). The rise of counterclaims within "sovereign" states from groups
claiming discrimination and seeking relief may lead to the division of
a territory into two or more distinct sovereign entities, as for example
the division of Czechoslovakia into two states in 1992. Peaceful devolution, in the extreme case into separate sovereign entities, is one way
to resolve an ethnic conflict, a solution not likely to provoke calls for
external assistance or intervention. Other "peaceful" transformations
of sovereignty have occurred in the breakup of the Mali Federation,
which existed for only a few months before it became two states, Mali
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and Senegal, the dissolution of the Malaysian Federation into Singapore and Malaysia, and the emergence of an independent Eritrea in
1993, separating from Ethiopia. When, however, group rights have
been violated for a long period and when state leaders bring issues to
an international forum, such as the United Nations, seeking resolution
of the internal contradictions in a sovereign state-usually other than
their .own-the proper, initial goal for intervention is not to eliminate
or violate sovereignty but to uphold and recreate the conditions that
justify sovereignty.
This argument, put forward by many analysts (see Reed and Kaysen
1993), calls for an examination of competing impulses of external states
regarding the affairs of countries fraught with internal conflict. Consider the parallel to the principle of colonialism, an accepted principle
of international affairs in earlier centuries, which was proscribed only
in the twentieth century (see Puchala and Hopkins 1983). The Trusteeship Council of the United Nations has the mandate to oversee twelve
trust units and to further the elimination of colonialism. Its concern
to protect and establish sovereignty for peoples previously subjugated
by foreigners has principally focused on ending intervention by powerful states in the affairs of people separated geographically, linguistically, and ethnically from the colonial power (UNA/USA 1992). The
anticolonial theme has been aligned with the principle of noninterference or nonintervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states,
which has been a major bulwark and justification for the decolonialization work of the UN. The virtual elimination of trust units and formal
colonial relationships (perhaps the return of Hong Kong to China after
1997 will mark the last vestige of colonialism) allows for a shift of the
pendulum in the UN toward protecting rights of groups within states.
Although some theorists see "humanitarian intervention" as a dangerous principle and many representatives of recently independent states
resist or oppose such intervention, the trend is unambiguous.
It may be necessary to specify a variety of conditions and tests for
discussion and debate. An organization such as the UN would need
to review evidence in a particular context before authorizing intervention over "domestic" objections, as it did in Haiti in 1994. Nonetheless,
I propose these key conclusions: first, sovereignty is not inviolate; second, violations of human rights (whether defined by local or global
standards) provide a basis for intervention; and third, intervention can
be considered legitimate only after multilateral consideration of the
specific case and a formal resolution through the procedures of that
body.
What options can the United Nations exercise which would alter the
forces that increase the frequency of ethnic conflict and demands on
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IOs to intervene? Basically, as I have said, reconstruction of sovereignty
principles to make the requirement to protect human rights more explicit could improve the UN's ability to reduce ethnic tensions. Ethnic
conflicts that arise from constricted identifications and competing demands of people could be defused by reworking basic constitutional
formulas, altering territorial boundaries, and creating new, separate
states. In addition the UN could monitor state-society interactions and
the treatment of people. Altered sovereignty norms would allow states
to cooperate with the UN in gathering information and exposing
problems.
Reconstruction of state system norms to relax the strictly dichotomous view of sovereignty would also make it easier for parties to negotiate. Moreover, reconstruction would make humanitarian intervention
a norm consistent with other sovereignty norms. The UN already recognizes the right, even duty, of international personalities to intervene
for humanitarian causes, as in the work of the Red Cross or bilateral
nongovernmental organizations. UN humanitarian assistance, even if
it were delivered by force, similarly would be considered not interference or infringement on sovereignty (the domestic jurisdiction principle) but "an expression of that sovereignty" (Schachter 1991, 469).
Already chapter 7 of the UN Charter specifies enforcement mechanisms for preventing threats to peace. These have been used by the
Security Council to justify the use of force to end threats that include
human rights violations, notably the failure of a state as in the case
of Somalia.
Legitimizing humanitarian intervention, even when military force is
necessary, is consistent with the goal of developing tolerance across
competing identity groups. The prospect of this action is, in turn, a
basic incentive for pluralistic states to maintain accommodation arrangements. Nevertheless, changing international norms is likely to
be a slow process (Reed and Kaysen 1993), proceeding step by step. In
Somalia, for example, UN agencies might adopt the strategy of encouraging mutually profitable trade. In Bosnia any peace is likely to require
UN efforts to ensure fairness in legal decisions regulating key elements
of human life, including property rights and distribution of resources.
The UN could also legitimately undertake efforts to prevent ethnic
conflicts, monitoring antagonism between groups and suggesting formulas for reducing conflict. This sort of role would entail a UN presence among antagonistic groups, for example, Armenians and Turks,
Kurds and other Iranians, Palestinians and Israelis, Tamils and Sinhalese, Chinese and Malays, Hausas and Igbos, Hutus and Tutsis, and
Indian and Spanish descendants in Latin America.
Of course, structured antagonisms often produce latent rules for
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collective resistance, which imply conformity by all group members.
Thus ethnic conflicts can promote intragroup solidarity at the same
time as they create greater divisions between segregated communities.
From a global perspective, the expression of such antagonisms usually
erodes universal principles. Liberal norms asserting universal individual human rights become subordinated to attitudes asserting a particular group's rights. Terrorism and torture become legitimate. Universal
norms are weakened and anomie rises, especially among individuals
who have multiple ethnic identities.
Asserting "sovereignty" for each group could reduce these ill effects,
but only if property rights and other goals are divisible. The redefinition of goals by Israel and the PLO in September 1993 illustrates this
distinction. An intractable conflict becomes tractable once claims over
divisible goods, such as land, became negotiable. This redefining of
sovereignty issues could relieve the frustration of external brokers in
dealing with peoples who hold fairly deep, irrational mutual animosities. Once sovereignty is seen as a relative, less absolute condition, IOs
have a resource for driving bargains.
In contrast, the all-or-nothing element of absolute sovereignty exacerbates the situation and limits what IOs can do. Such norms are no
longer appropriate for a changed global society. Global anomie, exacerbated by liberalism, could be tempered by making the obligation to
protect citizens primary and subject to external evaluations. Reducing
sovereignty rights in this way would make it easier to construct a set
of accommodation rules for collective action by rival ethnic groups.
External norms are needed to steer those who have been born, raised,
acculturated, and elevated to positions of leadership in these communities. Without the continuing pressure of norms and rules from a
higher, external organization it is no wonder that hostility among confessional communities in Lebanon led to communal violence or that
in 1991-1994 efforts to reconcile groups that lived at peace for decades
in the former Yugoslavia have been relatively unsuccessful. As in Africa
these "states" were artificial constructs, subject to fragmentation. A
secular, unified nation-state was not acceptable as a solution; other
forms of social organization, however, were not available. Softening
sovereignty principles could make internationally sanctioned reconstructions of territorial and property rights part of solutions to ethnic conflicts.
Thus, altering sovereignty could reduce anomie. Neither of these
concepts, of course, is a static phenomenon in the social order. In
recent centuries, rival ethnic groups overcame antagonisms largely by
constructing arrangements that met principles and norms for the primary acceptable political organization, that is, the state (Kratochwil
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1989). Conflicts rooted in history and tradition have proven long-lived,
however, and when secession is the only option, they have become
deadly. The effort by external forces to redesign Serbia and Bosnia in
such a way as to leave but minimal basis for conflict, exemplifies a
trend toward a larger role for outsiders in promoting peace.

Ethnic Conflicts and IO Capabilities:
A Precarious Balance
The proposed role for IOs in reducing and ending ethnic conflict
remains problematic. Ethnic conflict in the 1990s between communities
with "distinctive collective identities" (as Milton Esman and Shibley
Telhami note in the Introduction) in their competition for scarce public
or private goods, including sovereign independence, has increasingly
resulted in violence. I said earlier that such violence calls for international response especially when warring groups violate global norms
regarding the basic rights of "innocent" people and threaten the
"peace" among other states. In these circumstances demand rises for
IO-sanctioned "humanitarian intervention" and "peace-making" efforts by outside agencies (Weiss 1990; Johanssen 1990; Lewis 1991).
My focus on the United Nations as the subject for addressing such
conflicts is narrower than the general scope of this volume. Esman and
Telhami discuss international organizations that are both public and
private, global and regional, diffuse and narrowly functional. As noted
earlier, I believe the universality of the United Nations gives it unique
authority to address ethnic conflicts. Regional organizations such as
the OAU or the Arab League are less able to be neutral in a "neighborhood" dispute. The UN brings other strengths to the management of
ethnic conflict as well. Through its legislative organs, for example, it is
able to define the character of conflicts. As a practical matter, the UN
was the logical agent for judicial action on crimes against humanity
committed in former Yugoslavia. Another strength is coordination.
The UN in 1991 established the Department of Humanitarian Affairs
to coordinate worldwide deliveries of relief supplies to conflict victims.
Capabilities are limited, however. The UN has few regular financial
resources for humanitarian or peace-keeping missions, and no military
arm of its own with which to apply force. Paradoxically, this organizational impotence often makes the UN more acceptable as an outside
broker by parties in conflict, at least in certain circumstances.
The political role of the UN was largely marginal during the cold war.
Though it was founded in 1945 to further global peace and economic
prosperity, its institutional value in assisting cooperation and coordina-
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tion among states was vitiated by deep ideological divisions (both EastWest and North-South) and military conflicts outside its purview (in
Europe, Vietnam, the Middle East, and Afghanistan). By the end of
the 1950s, with the admission of a growing number of impoverished
but newly independent countries, the role of the United Nations increasingly shifted to development.\Efforts to settle purely ethnic conflicts were largely relegated to ad hoc interventions by individual states
(Syria in Lebanon in 1975 or India in Sri Lanka in 1989) and to very
"careful" diplomacy including indirect intervention by the superpowers (the Yorn Kippur War of 1973, the Ethiopian-Somalian War
of 1977-1978). Other cases, such as Czechoslovakia (1968), Vietnam
(1961-1975) and Afghanistan (1979-1988)-to the extent they involved
ethnic conflict-we~t1 beyond indirect intervention but illustrate the
exclusion of the UN. tThe Cyprus peace-keeping effort, which did involve the UN, was a major exception. In general, then, ethnic conflict,
as it broke out in Africa and Asia and even among Latin American
groups (through the assertion of demands by Guatemalan and Peruvian Indians, for instance) was contained or marginalized by superpower impacts.
Since 1990, demands for action by the UN have grown (Bread for
the World 1992), far outpacing its capacity. Clearly the United Nations
cannot intervene in every ethnic conflict, but it cannot ignore conflicts
as it could, or even had to, before the end of the cold war. Either a
new and stronger formulation for addressing these problems must be
developed, including reforms that empower the UN to act effectively,
or its powerlessness in these crises will breed disillusionment and contempt. Indeed, speeches and "programs of action" are the established
forte of the United Nations, and not only on security issues.
To solve ethnic conflicts, especially those that have grown in recent
years, their sources must be understood. Some of these, rich, complex,
and often intractable, lie deeply imbedded in the history of the area
being contested (Horowitz 1985). Others, however, are to be found in
changing external circumstances, and these account for much of the
increase in recent years. Effective techniques to reduce conflicts, at
least as provided by external actors, particularly international institutions, will likely have to be different from the external techniques used
by the protagonists of the cold war. Certainly the UN cannot employ
such superpower techniques as military aid, covert action, and ideological alignment. Further, at present the UN is not constructed in a
way to exercise significant moderating influence on contestants, even
when it is presented with a mandate to do so, as in Somalia from 1991
to late in 1992 and early 1993 to 1994. When the initial UN effort proved
ineffectual, the U.S. government offered to send military troops under
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UN auspices and without a Somali invitation-thus creating new
precedents. Similarly in the Bosnian conflict, NATO forces, with U.S.
backing, were added to UN resources in 1993. Such novel action suggests that support exists for new UN modalities that might match the
"power vacuum" created by the end of the cold war.

Cold-War Containment of Ethnic Conflict
--During the cold war, at least within their respective realms of influence, the United States and the Soviet Union constrained ethnic conflict. Limits on ethnic rivalry were imposed by support for the coercive
capabilities of a central government authority. Such external support
helped suppress discontent (for example, separatist tendencies or demands for rights by minorities in the former Soviet Union, the Kurds
in the Middle East, the Somalis in Ethiopia, the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia, and the Chinese in several Asian states). In addition, the rivals in
the cold war provided a universal ideology that denied legitimacy to
ethnic rivalry. The tenets of Marxism and liberal capitalism legitimated
the actions of the two powers and of governments aligned with them,
while their universalist tenets delegitimated separatist claims of ethnic
groups. For example, the liberal emphasis on individual liberties provides no basis for group rights.
The alignment structure of the cold war had a pervasive influence.
For example, secessionist movements in Eritrea, Mozambique, or Sri
Lanka (among the Tamils), though recognizably sui generis often
turned to outside "allies" for material support. In addition, some
adopted models for national political order were provided by the Soviet
Union, the United States, or other sympathetic states. The weaker the
"state," or the more an issue crossed state boundaries, the more likely
it was that external assistance would be used to repress or ameliorate
Jhe_conflict '. In many cases where a state could manage the situation,
whether in Burma between the Karens and Burmese, in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh between Muslims and Hindus, and in various
Asian countries between overseas Chinese communities and a larger
dominant population (Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc.), the resolution of conflict was seen to be the responsibility of the accepted and
"legitimate" nation-state. Sovereignty exercised by a government with
recognition by and representation at the United Nations was respected.
The possibility of superpower involvement also encouraged "domestic" solutions to ethnic conflict, for it was often feared as likely to be
detrimental to all parties. Such calculations alone, it seems, inhibited
ethnic community members from committing resources to the assertion of rights or to demands for a separate political entity. The authority
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structure of territorial units created by European or American colonialism remained intact, for the most part, among the new states of the
post-World War II age.
~ The strong ideological antipathy and security strategies of these two
most powerful countries created the overarching structure within
which ethnic rights in world politics were protected or marginalized
from the end of World War II until the end of the 1980s (Waltz 1979;
Mearsheimer 1990). The dissolution of imperial relations within opposing blocs has overturned long-held expectations and abrogated reward
systems that had come to seem routine. In many former communist
states, particularly in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
the changes seem deep and irreversible. Without bipolar structures,
existing solidarities and rules of conduct for the governments of "nonaligned states," for example, or "Western Europe," are challenged.
Many rules and identities even seem anachronistic. Richer states have
less incentive to provide military and economic assistance to developing countries. Virtually all normative views about world affairs
have been affected. The collapse of the Soviet Union has created enormous changes in the structure of influence bearing on various regional
and ethnic hostilities, creating a "space" for the promotion of competing ethnic claims and the use of force to advance them-actions that
previously were held in check by the anticipation that they would
prove unsuccessful (Moynihan 1993). Thus, while the end of the cold
war did not create ethnic rivalries, it did open new space for them to
be played out.
External pressures worked in many ways. Many ethnic groups
forged coalitions based on anticolonial nationalism in opposition to the
colonial power (Emerson 1960; Rustow 1967). The two "sides" of the
cold war diminished internal conflict in multiethnic states by providing
material support to dominant but weak groups, as, for example, when
the United States lent its support to suppress "rebellions" (Leites and
Wolf 1970; Rothchild and Olorunsola 1983). Ideological principles of
the superpower contest also denied legitimacy to particularistic partisanship during the cold war. Thus many states-especially those
closely controlled by one or the other superpower-had support in
containing ethnic rivalries and bolstering central authority. Ethnic
separatism was silenced by coercion. The former Soviet Union helped
the government of Ethiopia to repress dissident ethnic groups in the
late 1970s and 1980s; the United States supported the Peruvian government in its effort to restrain Indian demands. Authoritarian order was
assisted, when necessary, over democratic movements. In addition to
direct repression, communist and capitalist ideologies, as noted, provided ~upport for political institutions that opposed secession or the
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expression of ethnic culture in the form of political demands. Their
universalism marginalized the validity of claims based on "subnational" or separate identities. Such subordinated groups, however,
often carried "hidden scripts" about the evilness of the "other,"
allowing feelings of discontent and hatred to fester while group members practiced a variety of noncompliance and opposition behavior (see
Scott 1985, 1990 ). The recent break-up of Yugoslavia exposed many
such hidden views or "scripts" among its several ethnic minorities.
Collective scripts of ethnic antagonism, therefore, whether of Palestinians in Israel or Sikhs in India, were partially repressed, subordinated to global nuclear rivalry between the superpowers. Major
industrial states aligned themselves to protect peoples within their
sphere of influence from the horrific prospect of nuclear war and, to
varying degrees, the penetration of opposing ideologies. Some newly
independent states-Guinea, Somalia, Cuba, for example-seeking industrialization, aligned themselves with the "communist bloc," selecting a Leninist rationale for centralized rule. Certainly, a number of
states developed authoritarian rule. Many newly independent states
bolstered the solidarity of their order through a strategy of trade with
Western industrial states and economic assistance from them, and this
formula aided the political security and economic capacity of the central state Oackson and Rosberg 1982). By and large the 1945-1989 world
was one of "sovereign" nation-states making foreign policy decisions
in light of the cold war; ethnic conflicts were secondary concerns. The
problem is that many of these states, especially in Africa and the Middle East, are fragile, rather artificial constructs Oackson 1990). With
external props removed, internal conflicts are less readily managed by
existing arrangements, as is most dramatically evident in the breakdown of the Somalian state.

UN Containment of Ethnic Conflict
Have the recent interventions by IOs, particularly of the United Nations, created new roles for IOs in international order? Is resolving
ethnic conflicts likely to be an important task for international institutions, particularly the United Nations? And can universalist international bodies provide effective external resources to mitigate conflict,
sufficient to replace the kind of structure and inducements supplied
during the cold war?
Before these questions can be probed a review of the demands on
the UN and IOs to help mitigate ethnic conflict is in order. Cold-war
factors kept demands on UN involvement modest in marked contrast
to the surge of interventions since 1990. Demand for containment, as in
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former Yugoslavia, has outpaced physical and organizational capacity,
generating high probability of institutional overstretch and even failure.
The transformation of the UN over the last fifty years from 50 to over
180 members contributed to this expansion in the scope of responsibilities while attenuating capacity for decisiveness on issues of sovereignty and treatment of nationals in pluralist states.
The limited capacity of the United Nations in the 1990s to contain
ethnic conflicts is also partly a legacy of the cold war. Historically,
UN action was predicated on principles of nonintervention and the
application of self-determination "rights," especially with regard to
ending "colonialism" by Western states. As a consequence, the UN
has limited capacity to provide good offices (for example, in Liberia
and Lebanon), virtually no ability to send in an effective peace-keeping
force when invited by protagonists (for example, in Angola and the
former Yugoslavia), or to intervene without an invitation when human
rights are violated even when there is support by an international
public to end such abuses (as in Somalia). The scope of action supported by member governments has been relatively limited.
Perhaps the most unsuccessful UN effort to intervene in a situation
of ethnic conflict under crumbling state authority was the intervention
in the Congo (now Zaire) in 1960. After three years of continuing strife,
the death of the secretary-general, and its own near bankruptcy (see
Franck 1985), the UN pulled out. This fiasco disinclined future UN
executive leadership to promote intervention. It also discouraged support from key countries on the Security Council to commit resources
to such undertakings.
- -Another factor leading to a decline in willingness to intervene, in
addition to the UN's own institutional legacies, is the orientations of
inembers from less-devel~p~d co_untries. Intervention, even to bring
about peaceful resolution of ethnic conflict, is frequently perceived
by new states-those recently gaining independence under the selfdetermination element of sovereignty-as a threat to the force of sovereignty principles. Proposals in the United Nations to condemn violence in Cambodia or human rights violations in Chile or to call for an
end to ethnic or religious conflict in Lebanon or Sri Lanka have been
opposed by some or many developing countries, which have been
leery of establishing a dangerous precedent for undermining their
newly won sovereignty.
-Prom the 1960s to the 1990s, to the extent that leaders in Western
industrialized countries or the Soviet Union felt an interest in or an
obligation to address problems of ethnic conflict, they did so on a
bilateral basis or through regional organizations they largely controlled
such as NATO or the Warsaw Pact. In fact, very little effective interna-
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tional intervention occurred, whether in the form of good offices, resources to induce negotiations, or outright threats to deter aggression
and violation of state system rules. The case of Idi Amin, who came
to power in 1971 in Uganda, is instructive. This pathological personality was at once a world-class buffoon and a source of extreme internal
terror (see Southall 1980). Initial supporters of Amin's government,
such as many Arab states (with the exception of Libya and perhaps
Saudi Arabia) withdrew support and assistance by the mid-197os. Most
of the world viewed the regime with considerable repugnance. Many
states accepted political refugees. Nonetheless, neither the Organization of African Unity, the United Nations, nor even major states, acting
unilaterally or with independent but coordinated policies, took serious
steps to end transparent violations of the basic norms that provide the
very justification of a nation-state. Amin's brief 1979 invasion of a strip
of land between Uganda and Tanzania provided the catalyst for a
counterinvasion organized and largely supplied by Tanzania. Although the invasion was condemned by the OAU as violating principles of sovereignty and nonintervention, a number of Western states,
particularly the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries, provided resources (on the order of a million dollars a day) to assist the Tanzanian
government and its military in a successful effort to overthrow the
Amin regime and disband state terrorist organizations. The Tanzanian
intervention also allowed approximately two thousand Libyan troops
that had been sent to support the regime to fly home with their weapons. Once a semblance of order was restored, albeit with considerable
turbulence, Tanzanian troops withdrew. Since 1979, or more clearly
since Yoweri Museveni took power in the mid-198os, Uganda has reestablished its character as an independent state with diverse populations and an effective central government. Respect for law, reasonably
sane leadership, and some semblance of national unity exists in most
of that country. Throughout this episode, inhibitions kept out interventions by regional organizations, the UN, and the superpower rivals in
what, it became increasingly clear, was a case of a minority-Nubianethnic group terrorizing other groups.
In 1994 the atmosphere has changed. Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Angola, and Mozambique are among the major IO intervention responding to a breakdown of civil order in Africa. Yet in the former
Yugoslavia, divided into separate states by rising ethnic "nationalism,"
the dominant Serbs have redrawn boundaries by force. UN efforts
did not prevent thousands of innocent deaths and brutal violations of
human rights. In Somalia an even more chaotic and capricious decay
of political institutions has occurred. By 1991 clan factionalism and
governmental anarchy had appalling consequences for the lives and
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property of Somali citizens. Among other things, the collapse of national institutions meant that relief efforts by international groups,
both private and governmental, were rendered ineffective by extortion
and robbery carried out by rival political leaders and their largely unpaid but heavily armed supporters. In this context, the UN withdrew
in February of 1991 after failing in the initial objective; it then hoped
for military forces of the United States and other states to enter Somalia
with the UN-authorized goal of creating a more "secure environment."
This devolved as the only way to allow emergency relief operations to
proceed (see Branigin 1992). Prodded by the United States and others
in November 1992, the UN returned to Somalia in May 1993 with the
more ambitious goal of establishing a coherent Somali nation-state by
1995. Attempts to negotiate among the factions a pact for reestablishing the Somali state largely failed and the negotiations required the
UN to oppose the declaration of independence by leaders of the former
British Somalia seeking recognition of a new country, Somaliland.
Thus, no state or international body has recognized this claim from
the most stable area of Somali territory (although the British government quite seriously considered doing so [Samatar 1992]).
In the face of such rising demands for intervention the United Nations, as noted already, is resource weak. Not only does it lack finances,
but it lacks administrative capability to deal effectively with ethnic
conflicts. Thus it is being asked to do something of which it is now
incapable. The situation is much like that facing the nation-states of
Africa in the 1960s. There seemed great promise for these "new" institutions; expectations of their ability to solve problems were high. Yet
after thirty years many have proven to be failures, owing in part to the
overextension and subsequent collapse of the state (see World Bank
1989; Chazan et. al. 1992). Analogously, the United Nations, pressed
to meet rising expectations, may find itself overextended and behaving
counterproductively.
The UN requires greater information, relief, logistical, and military
resources if it is to be effective in addressing and defusing international
ethnic conflicts. Its budget for peace keeping and peace making is
limited. Their costs were about 5 percent of the UN budget at the
beginning of the 1990s (Branigin 1992a), but such activities are expensive, and more money will have to be found if the UN accepts this role.
In 1993 the budget for regular operations was strained; hopes to pay
UN bills through donations were described as "financial bungee jumping" (" As Ethnic Wars Multiply UN Struggles to Meet the Challenge,"
New York Times, February 7, 1993, pp. 1, 14). The costs of peace keeping
nearly tripled in 1992 from the previous year, and in each case the UN
relies on special assessments and emergency appeals (Lone 1992). The
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amounts needed are enormous compared to historical expenditures.
In Cambodia, for example, the UN spent over $1. 3 billion on peacekeeping operations in 1992-1993, more than all the funds used for
peace keeping in its previous forty-six years. This amount, in turn, is
swamped by the off-budget costs of operations authorized by the UN,
as in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991 (over $60 billion) and Somalia in
1992-1994.
Regular financial resources are also a major issue. In the mid-198os
the new budget committee began to enforce a no-growth rule on the
Secretariat, the central leadership, in exchange for the promise to pay
delinquent assessments. Thus, even as the Secretariat has been expected to undertake many new and critical tasks, its budget has been
flat (Branigin 1992a). In spite of the procedural compromise on budget
issues between major contributors and poorer states, which have a
majority in the General Assembly, UN finances remain fragile. Unpaid
assessed UN dues are over $1 billion with the United States and Russia
having the largest delinquencies (Ogata and Volcker 1993, 8). Nonassessed or voluntary contributions, based on pledges (usually paid),
make up nearly half the UN system costs. Of the relief and other
resources available for intervention in ethnic conflicts, almost all are
from voluntary contributions. UN appeals for emergency relief totaled
nearly $3 billion dollars in 1992. These appeals, met by a multitude of
voluntary donations, have grown dramatically as popular opinion inside states has supported efforts to assist innocent people trapped in
disintegrating states. Funds flow both through the UN and through
bilateral national arrangements, including overseas nongovernmental
organizations. The 1992 appeal for Somalia, for example, was met by
resources from thirty-two states and international organizations. Only
a portion of these relief resources appeared in the UN budget.
Another costly capability, military force, is nonexistent, aside from
building guards. There are proposals to extend the voluntary provision
of national troops to the UN. Indeed, some implementation of these
proposals has begun. Training programs have been developed, for example, in the United States, so that designated units of the American
military could receive training appropriate for performing multinational military tasks, that is, develop skills appropriate for serving with
troops from various countries-for example, learning rules for serving
within a multinational common command. Such "callable" military resources, similar to callable pledges for food aid, are widely envisaged,
but the methods and commitments are as yet lacking. Thus in 19901994 when the UN has authorized sending coercive force into another
country, leadership has been decided by ad hoc national coalitions.
Creating a truly multinational force remains a great challenge to con-

ANOMIE, REFORM, AND CHALLENGES

93

temporary norms and practices. Another challenge is combining relief
work and military force, especially sending troops into areas without
the explicit permission of a "sovereign" government; recent "experiments" in Rwanda, Somalia, and parts of Iraq have created the
precedent .
.Another resource problem is the arcane bureaucratic structure of
the UN organization itself, a nest of specialized agencies, which often
compete for jurisdjctiort or credit. In ethnic conflict situations they have
exhibited their rivalry, jockeying for position with one another and
debating procedure and responsibility. Infighting among semiautonomous, almost feudal organizations, is an important barrier to effective
action by the Secretariat. Moreover, even the Secretariat has familiar
aspects of bureaucratic weakness-budget protection, inertia, avoidance of tasks for which failure is possible. In addition, the UN is far
less disciplined as an organization than most national governments.
In spite of the complicated bureaucracy, the UN does adapt to
achieve effectiveness. Consider its institutional performance in providing food to victims of ethnic conflict. As with most cases, UN procedure calls for mobilizing food and other resources from donors: the
World Food Program has the prominent lead to do this. Relief supplies
are then provided to the legal authorities of a state. In the case of
conflicts such as Ethiopia (1980s), Liberia, Sudan, Bosnia, and Somalia
this formula is not effective since recipient governments often allocate
supplies in ways that vitiate their intended purpose, or worse, no effective government exists to which supplies can be given for distribution.
In Somalia the UN surmounted this problem by working through overseas nongovernmental organizations. The secretary-general appointed
the president of one of the largest such organizations, Philip Johnston
of CARE, as a special representative and gave him the job of coordinating all relief activity among UN agencies and dozens of nongovernmental organizations in 1992 and early 1993. In general, the UN lacks
competency in on-the-ground operations. Following experiences in
northern Iraq among the Kurds and in Somalia, where effective relief
efforts required coordinating the activities of foreign military forces
and voluntary organizations, international bureaucratic capabilities
have been developed to manage military interventions whose aim is to
provide relief but this capability exists largely thanks to ad hoc efforts.
The UN also has weak intelligence capabilities. In the wake of the
Persian Gulf War, for example; ON-inspection/compliance teams had
to create, virtually from scratch, the kind of information and control
networks needed for coordinating and leading overseas operations,
whereas such capability is well developed in national governments.
The current cap on the budget of the Secretariat will prevent mainte-
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nance of these crucial control and intelligence features, although they
are basic to operations needing round-the-clock command centers such
as the UN has begun to undertake. Furthermore, the UN relies heavily
on information supplied by national governments. In the past, some
data, however suspect, have had to be publicly presented because of
the UN's historical acceptance of the sovereign right of states to control
information. In other instances, special UN efforts have developed independent monitoring (as the World Food Program has done for food
aid) or special commissions have been sent to investigate questions,
such as human rights in Chile or cases of murder during the civil war
in El Salvador in the 1980s. Independent information gathering remains the exception, however, not the rule.
A final weakness in IOs, and certainly the UN, is that separate national identities of its personnel foster interpersonal and intergroup
conflict. In considering how the external intervention of IOs, particularly the UN, can reduce ethnic conflict, it is germane to consider the
degree to which ethnicity within the IOs themselves creates allegiances
and rivalries. UN staff members have a national history. They carry a
set of identifications, antagonisms, and ways of thinking developed
from personal ethnicities and national identities. As a result, their ability to collaborate is far less than that of civil servants in most national
governments. In the governments of most states, unlike the "government" of international institutions, role occupants share roughly the
same heritage. The authority of state office, carrying the power to
tax and punish, is supported by sovereignty norms. Accountability is
bolstered by norms of civic duty and a common "we feeling" (Deutsch
1966) arising from loyalty to the nation. UN officials lack this common ground.
In the UN there are special linkages among peoples who are Arabs,
for example, or Asians, Europeans, Americans, and Africans. Ethnic
and regional ties facilitate quick easy communication; alliances form
among "ethnic" officeholders to push policies for which they share a
• preference. This aspect of the UN should not be confused with the
issue of subordination of UN duties to national obligations, which was
common among Russians and others from the Soviet empire for many
years. Often they controlled offices as an extension of their state's
power, and their role was to serve their state, not defer to the norms
of an international civil servant. Individuals could be rotated home
while the office remained in the control of the same state. Much of
this denial of role responsibilities to an international civil service has
dissipated with the demise of the Soviet Union.
Regional organizations, as noted earlier, offer few solutions to weakness in the UN-either in financial resources or in management skills.
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Consider the frustrated attempt of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) to intervene in the Liberian conflict in August 1990. A minority group, the Krahns, 4 percent of the population,
held power by force and (electoral) fraud. They were challenged by
other groups, notably the Gios and Manos. With backing by Libya and
Burkina Faso, Charles Taylor led an uprising in 1990 which was fought
to a bloody stalemate. After appeals to the OAU and several other
parties to intervene went unheeded, ECOWAS sent troops to restore
order, especially in the capital of Monrovia. After two years of intervention, principally by Nigeria and Ghana, the ECOWAS force had become
one combatant in the internal struggle. While some ECOWAS members
continue to support Taylor, ECOWAS troops support a designated new
president, Amos Sawyer. The UN was initially blocked from considering action in Liberia by Ethiopia and Zaire (then dissenting members
of the Security Council); the UN acknowledged the intervention only
a year and a half later (Inegbedion 1992, 11-33). The Liberian case
illustrates that ethnic and particularistic ties can be divisive in regional
organizations and that regional sensitivities can block UN action. The
prospects for successful intervention by regional organizations in cases
of ethnic conflict seem even weaker than those of the UN, especially
without greater resources than they currently enjoy.
With institutional reform, IOs could reduce the likelihood of ineffective and impotent undertakings. Furthermore, with clear, reconstructed norms that made the issue of sovereignty more pliable and
subject to the collective decisions of UN members, the Ut-J could participate in redrawing maps. Such participation would require more
independent intelligence capability and appropriately skilled staff. Finally, reducing the feudal character of the UN, perhaps by altering the
practice of providing separate funding to its specialized agencies, could
create more productive relationships in the UN system. The resources
and internal capabilities of IOs certainly must be brought closer to the
levels needed to fulfill expected tasks if there is to be effective IO
response to ethnic conflicts or other challenges in the future.
The weakening of international institutional order is the central issue
of the 1990s, and rising ethnic conflicts are a particularly poignant and
clear consequence of it. _Another result is increased demand on the
_United Nations system to contain such conflicts. Arguably, the post~old-war era of global politics may be best understood as the era of
ethnic and cultural warfare.
Rousseau's proposal for social order is that people must be forced to
be free. This is an apt description of the current paradox in international affairs. Liberal principles have gained ascendancy but fail to
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construct sufficient authority for their maintenance. Hence demands
for new states by ethnic groups claiming overlapping territory for their
nationhood cannot be settled, at least not peacefully or with hope
of endurance.
A major tension exists between the historical principle of sovereignty
and the call for international intervention on humanitarian grounds to
end ethnic conflicts. This tension is resolvable, however, if parochial
elements in the conception of sovereignty are abandoned. Intervention
in a situation where violations of human rights indicate a lack of the
guarantees justifying sovereignty does not violate the basic purposes
of sovereignty. Once a government, although putatively having a legitimate monopoly of coercive power over a people and territory, fails to
fulfill the basic purposes for its independence, to wit, providing safety
and fundamental human rights to its population, then the principles
that guarantee that state's immunity from intervention (under article
2, paragraph 1, of the UN Charter) are undermined.
The rise of ethnic conflict, in part "released" by an erosion of norms
previously upheld by the cold war, has increased anomie in the international system. Freed from the normative constraints of competing
ideologies, people have more forcibly asserted their demands for a
variety of political "goods." In Korea and South Africa more democratic
rule has been sought. In other, more extreme instances, such as the
breakup of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and the states on the Horn
of Africa, demands for sovereign independence have been made. As
cold war international norms have become less clear and binding, ethnic groups have had wider scope to press their claims.
At the same time, the end of the cold war has created new policy
space for reconfiguring and strengthening the United Nations as an
international institution. States and peoples are asking the United Nations and other IOs, to undertake new tasks, including intervention
to manage ethnic conflict. The support for IO action is a reaction. to
the weakening of normative structures and the resources dedicated to
upholding them-defense and foreign affairs budgets that for forty
years propped up states allied in accord with cold war dynamics.
I believe that current shifts in demands and expectations point toward a new path for international organizations. Leaders of major
states of the world and UN officials have urged changes to expand
IO responsibilities (Boutros-Ghali 1992b ). These include multilateral
procedures for authorizing intervention, to be backed by additional
resources for international organizations to use in managing ethnic
conflicts. Concurrently, IO bureaucracies need reshaping to reduce internal organizational conflict. Such changes would begin to address
the severe limitations of IOs, as presently constituted, in intervening
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in ethnic conflicts. Reconstruction of the meaning of sovereignty to
incorporate toleration of humanitarian intervention and to recognize
degrees of sovereignty (rather than a yes/no reality) is also recommended. This normative shift is inherent in the increased demand for
IO intervention to bring peace in situations of violent ethnic conflict.
Such reformulation would be one step toward filling the normative
vacuum left by the decline of revolutionary communism and bipolar
ideologies.

